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This paper presents a theory of the allocation of authority in an organization in which 
centralization is limited by the agent’s ability to disobey the principal. We show that 
workers are given more authority when they are costly to replace or do not mind looking 
for another job, even if they have no better information than the principal. The allocation 
of authority thus depends on external market conditions as well as the information and 
agency problems emphasized in the literature. Evidence from a national survey of 
organizations shows that worker autonomy is related to separation costs as the theory 
predicts. 
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1.  Introduction 
  The allocation of authority is a critical part of the architecture of an organization. 
The traditional view is that decision rights ought to be placed in the hands of those with 
relevant information – retained by the manager when coordination is important and 
delegated to subordinates when their local expertise is critical (Simon, 1945/1997; 
Barnard, 1938/1968; Arrow, 1974). A more recent literature formalizes this tradeoff, 
showing how decision rights affect incentives to acquire and accurately communicate 
information as well as impact agency problems (Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Dessein 2002; 
Marino and Matsusaka, 2005). Yet even when information and agency conditions are 
such that a manager would like to make the decision, casual observation suggests he may 
lack the means to induce the worker to carry it out. A manager can tell his sales force to 
push one of the firm’s products over the other but the workers in the field can undermine 
the order with a lackluster effort for the product that they dislike. Or, to take an example 
that might be closer to home, a dean can set standards for classroom instruction (theory 
versus applications, cases versus lectures, and so on) but faculty can sabotage the 
standards with halfhearted implementation. Since tenured faculty are difficult to dismiss 
and monetary incentives are weak in a university, a dean may lack the tools necessary to 
enforce an order, and may have no choice but to delegate decision authority to individual 
faculty. Professors may enjoy significant control over how they do their jobs not because 
such an assignment of authority is optimal from an information or agency perspective, 
but because there is no way for the dean to centralize authority. 
  While the idea that authority is limited by ineffective enforcement was noted in 
the classic texts on management and organization, it is largely absent from the modern   2
literature.
1 The purpose of our paper is to spotlight the importance of disobedience for the 
allocation of authority in organizations by developing a formal framework, tracing out its 
implications, and suggesting its empirical relevance. Our model focuses on two important 
tools that managers can use to enforce orders. One is the threat of dismissal:  “Within the 
firm, the sanctions which authority can use are basically those of hiring and firing” 
(Arrow, 1974, p. 71). Authority is limited when workers do not fear being fired, or when 
the manager finds it very costly to find and train a replacement worker. Workers who are 
costly to replace or who do not mind looking for another job have more scope to disobey 
an order, and in our analysis end up being given more control over how they carry out 
their assignments.  
One implication is that if white collar workers are more costly to replace than blue 
collar workers, as survey evidence suggests, white collar workers may be given more 
autonomy than blue collar workers, even when it comes to routine tasks where they have 
no information advantage. Our approach also implies that authority hinges not only on an 
internal calculus involving hidden information or action, as in the traditional approach, 
but on surrounding market conditions because a worker’s cost of being fired depends on 
the quality of the external labor market. A broadening and deepening of labor markets 
                                                 
1 For example, “Disobedience to orders, organized or unorganized, frequently sets limits to authority,” 
Arrow (1974, p. 75); “Now a most significant fact of general observation relative to authority is the extent 
to which it is ineffective in specific instances. It is so ineffective that the violation of authority is accepted 
as a matter of course and its implications are not considered,” Barnard (1938/1968, p. 161); “The real 
limiting factors [in a military operation] are the psychological factors which determine when the soldiers 
will refuse further obedience to commands,” Simon (1945/1997, p. 200). Landier et al. (2005) and Van den 
Steen (2005) are two recent papers that also consider disobedience in a model of authority.   3
that reduces a worker’s cost of finding a new job would make workers less obedient and 
result in more worker autonomy, consistent with a long run trend that some have 
observed (Simon 1945/1997, Ch. 7). Similarly, to the extent that workers are more 
difficult to fire in Europe than the United States, our model suggests that European 
managers will have less authority over their workers. 
  Monetary incentives are another important tool to enforce commands. When we 
introduce contingent performance contracts into our model with limited liability, we find 
that the effect of monetary incentives depends on the firm’s cost of dismissing a worker. 
When the firm’s dismissal cost is low, monetary incentives can lead to more 
centralization by allowing the manager to enforce a command that would not be 
enforceable with only the threat of dismissal. When the firm’s dismissal cost is high, 
monetary incentives can lead to more delegation by making the threat of dismissal less 
credible. One implication is that new information technologies that allow more accurate 
monitoring of worker performance and hence facilitate formal incentive contracts will 
lead to more delegation for workers that are costly to replace, consistent with evidence in 
Moers (2006).   
  The fact that managers may be forced to delegate decisions for certain workers 
has implications for hiring policies, managerial styles, and span of control, that do not 
arise in models where compliance is guaranteed: 
•  Hiring policy. If there are certain jobs for which decisions must be delegated, it is 
important to fill those jobs with workers whose preferences are aligned with the 
organization’s interests. In contrast, for jobs where workers will be told what to 
do, preference alignment is less important than having workers whose actions   4
have a large effect on payoffs. Thus, to the extent that white collar workers are 
intrinsically harder to replace and given more decision authority than blue collar 
workers, managers will be relatively more interested in hiring workers that “share 
the organization’s values” when it comes to white collar jobs, and more interested 
in raw ability when it comes to blue collar jobs. 
•  Managerial traits. Evidence in economics and psychology suggests that managers 
may be inherently different in their empathy towards workers, desire for power, 
and other attributes. We show that a manager with empathy for his workers tends 
to delegate more because he seeks to avoid giving orders that are disobeyed and 
require disciplinary action, whereas a manager with a lust for power tends to give 
more orders, dismiss more workers, and experience more disobedience. 
•  Span of control. Previous research suggests that the span of control is limited 
because information costs increase as the number of subordinates grows. We 
show that even when information is not constraining, disobedience may limit the 
span of control. If the marginal cost of replacing a worker is increasing in the 
number of dismissals, a manager is unable to enforce his orders when his work 
force is too large. 
  In addition to linking our results to existing empirical studies, we provide some 
new evidence on our central implications by studying the autonomy of workers in a 
sample of firms in the National Organizations Survey, 1996-97 and 2002. Consistent with 
our model, in a regression framework we find that workers are given more autonomy in 
carrying out their tasks when it is costly for the firm to replace them and when workers 
have good outside job opportunities. We also find more delegation in smaller firms,   5
where the loss of an individual worker is likely to be more disruptive in the short run, 
than in larger firms.   
Our analysis is related to several strands of the literature. A growing body of 
research often associated with Aghion and Tirole (1997) considers the limits on authority 
that arise from the principal’s limited information.
2 We are interested primarily in an 
external limit to authority – even if the principal wants to make a decision, he may not 
have the means to force the agent to carry out the decision. The premise of our analysis is 
that managerial authority ultimately depends on the willingness of workers to follow 
orders, what Simon (1945/1997; 1991) calls the worker’s “zone of acceptance” and 
Barnard (1938/1968) calls the “zone of indifference.”  Baker et al. (1999) assume, in 
contrast, that managerial authority is unlimited and can never be transferred to a 
subordinate. They study how reputation can be used to effectively delegate authority to 
agents. Our paper and Baker et al. can be thought of as focusing on different types of 
decisions: Baker et al. applies to decisions that do not require implementation by the 
agent (perhaps certain types of promotion decisions) while we focus on decisions that can 
only be implemented by the agent. Disobedience is also the focus of Landier et al. (2005), 
who investigate when disobedience can be optimal for an organization, and plays a role 
in Van den Steen (2005), who studies how authority influences the tradeoff between 
coordination and the motivation of agents.  
                                                 
2 Work in this vein includes Holmstrom (1977, Ch. 2), Dessein (2002), Prendergast (2002), Zabojnik 
(2002), Marino and Matsusaka (2005), and Alonso and Matouschek (2006). The theoretical tradeoffs 
affecting the incentive to acquire and transmit information were also developed by Gilligan and Krehbiel 
(1987, 1989) in the context of legislative organization.   6
Finally, our consideration of the threat of dismissal as one tool for disciplining 
workers makes our paper related to the shirking models of efficiency wages (e.g., Shapiro 
and Stiglitz, 1984). In this strand of literature, the closest paper is Acemoglu and 
Newman (2002), which shows how the amount of monitoring within a firm is influenced 
by external labor market conditions. The main difference of our analysis is that we 
endogenize the allocation of decisionmaking authority (assumed to be delegated to the 
worker in the efficiency wage literature), explore how market conditions influence 
patterns of authority, and investigate the consequence for hiring policies, managerial 
traits, and span of control.     
  The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 
identifies the key factors that limit the authority of the manager and derives the main 
implications of the model. Section 4 introduces monetary incentives. Section 5 examines 
several extensions of the basic model, including hiring policies, managerial traits, and 
span of control. Section 6 reports the empirical evidence. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  The Model 
  A principal supervises an agent on a project that takes two periods ( 2 , 1 = t ) to 
complete. This can represent a manager and worker, a CEO and division manager, a dean 
and professor in a university, and so on. The principal cannot implement the project 
himself – he requires the agent to do it – but he can replace an unsatisfactory agent with 
another agent. All actors are risk neutral and discount the future at  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ δ . 
 
   7
A.  Actions and Payoffs 
  The project’s return is realized at the end of the second period, but consists of a 
payoff generated each period. For example, in the first period a sales person makes an 
initial visit to a potential customer, and in the second period the deal is closed. The final 
revenue is the combination of payoffs generated in both periods (both visits). 
  The return in each period depends on the state  } 2 , 1 { ∈ i  and an action chosen by 
the agent  } , { 2 1 a a a∈ . The states are equally likely, and the state persists across both 
periods. In state i, the principal’s payoff is  0 > H  if the action is  i a , and zero if the 
action is  i a− .  
The agent can be one of two types, and the type is not known by either the 
principal or agent initially. A “good” agent has preferences congruent with the principal’s 
preferences, while a “bad” agent’s preferences run in opposition to the principal’s 
interests. Specifically, in state i, a good agent receives private benefits  0 > b  from action 
i a , and receives zero from action  i a− . In contrast, a bad agent in state i receives b from 
action  i a− , and receives zero from action  i a . Since the principal’s payoffs depend on the 
state, whether the agent is good or bad also depends on the state. One way to think about 
this is that the agent knows which action he prefers to take (sell product A or B, teach 
cases or theory), but does not know if that action is in the principal’s interest (because the 
agent does not know the state). An agent is “good” if what he likes to do happens to be 
what is good for the principal, and the agent is “bad” if he likes to do what is bad for the 
principal.    8
Payoffs as a function of states and actions are summarized in Table 1.
3 For 
simplicity, the payoff matrix and action choices are identical in each period. For example, 
if the project generates a payoff of H in the first period and H in the second period, the 
return at the end of the second period is  H 2 . 
 
B.  Information 
  Neither the principal nor the agent knows the agent’s type at the time of hiring, 
but they both know that their preferences are congruent (the agent is “good”) with 
probability α . The principal may choose to dismiss the agent after the first period and 
hire a new agent to complete the project in the second period. The new agent’s 
probability of being congruent (good) is β . The parameters α  and β  may differ if the 
principal has learned something about the incumbent agent at some time before the start 
of our model.
4 A bad agent’s desire to appear to be a good agent is what may induce him 
to obey an order from the principal. 
  Neither the principal nor the agent knows the state initially. After the agent is 
hired and installed in the organization, the agent learns whether he prefers  1 a  or  2 a , that 
is, he observes which action gives him b and which gives zero. At this point, the agent 
does not know whether he is a good or bad type, however, because he cannot observe the 
                                                 
3 The payoff matrix in Table 1 essentially mirrors Aghion and Tirole (1997), including the normalization to 
zero of the principal’s and agent’s low payoff. All of our propositions and main comparative static 
implications continue to hold if the low payoff is nonzero. 
4 Separate congruence parameters for incumbent and replacement workers allow us to study how changes 
in the incumbent’s congruence affect the allocation of authority, holding constant the congruence of the 
pool of replacement workers.   9
state. For instance, the salesman might discover that he is better able to sell one of the 
firm’s products than the others, but he does not know if his favored product is the one 
that is most important for the firm’s overall strategy. 
  The principal can learn the state and give the agent an order at a cost of  0 > c . 
Continuing the previous example, the principal learns which of the products should be 
emphasized by the salesman in order to maximize the firm’s overall profit. If the 
principal gives a command, he will order action  i a  in state i.  
 
C.  Authority, Disobedience, and Contracting 
  If an order is given, the agent may follow the order or may disobey and choose 
the other action. The principal observes the agent’s action after it has been taken, but 
cannot overrule or otherwise directly force a particular action. That is, the sales manager 
cannot go into the field himself, and the dean cannot teach the classes himself. 
Contingent contracts based on output are feasible, but the agent is protected by limited 
liability so that each period’s wage is nonnegative.
5 Let  t w  denote the wage at time t if 
output is H. When output is zero, the principal sets the wage equal to zero, to minimize 
the rents received by the agent.  
In addition to (or instead of) using monetary incentives, the principal can dismiss 
a disobedient agent and hire a replacement for the second period. If an agent is dismissed, 
the principal incurs a cost  P s  to find and train a replacement, and the agent incurs a cost 
                                                 
5 Allowing the contract to be conditional on whether an order is obeyed would not change anything. We do 
not consider multi-period contracts.   10
A s  to find a new job that pays his reservation utility of zero.
 6  The separation costs are 
incurred in the second period. 
  Instead of giving an order, the principal can delegate the decision to the agent. As 
discussed above, all of the principal’s payoffs arrive at the end of the second period. The 
salesman makes an initial visit to a client in the first period and a final visit to close the 
deal takes place in the second period. Since the principal has no payoff at the end of the 
first period, he cannot determine the agent’s type until the project is over if he does not 
know the state. The agent’s private benefits are received instantaneously in the first and 
second period, and the separation costs are paid in the second period.  
 
3.  Basic Tradeoffs When Monetary Incentives Are Not Feasible 
  In order to highlight the basic intuition of our analysis, we start by considering the 
case where monetary contracts are not feasible. 
 
A.  Authority when the Agent Obeys 
  The principal’s expected utility depends on whether he gives an order, and how 
the agent responds. At one extreme, the principal retains authority, becomes informed, 
and gives an order that the agent obeys. His expected utility in this case of 
“centralization” is 
 
(1)  H H c V
C δα δ + + − = . 
 
                                                 
6 Allowing the agent to obtain private benefits in his new job would not affect our qualitative results.   11
The cost c is paid to collect information and issue an order. The agent obeys the order in 
the first period, producing a return of H. In the second period, the agent’s choice 
produces H or zero depending on his type. All revenue from the project is discounted 
because it arrives in the second period. 
  At the other extreme, the principal delegates the decision to the agent. Since the 
agent does not know the state, he chooses his privately optimal action. The principal’s 
payoff in this “delegation” case is 
 
(2)  H V
D δα 2 = . 
 
  A comparison of (1) and (2) shows that centralization when the agent obeys is 
better for the principal than delegation if  
 
(3)  H c ) 1 ( α δ − < . 
 
  Thus, centralization is preferred when the principal’s cost of becoming informed 
(c) is low, when the agent’s preferences differ from the principal’s preferences (α  is 
small), and when the agent’s action choice has a significant impact on the principal’s 
return (H  is large), that is, it is an “important” decision from the principal’s perspective.
7 
                                                 
7 Our result that centralization is more valuable when α is low stems from the fact that a good agent makes 
the right choice from the principal’s perspective, while the bad agent requires direction. If the model were 
set up so that the good agent requires direction from the principal to make the right choice, this result 
would be reversed. Our choice is consistent with Aghion and Tirole (1997) but our main conclusions with 
respect to separation costs do not depend on this modeling decision.   12
These tradeoffs are fairly standard in models of delegation, and appear in a variety of 
models where the principal’s orders are automatically accepted by the agent (for 
example, Aghion-Tirole, 1997; Baker et al., 1999). Since we are primarily interested in 
the factors that limit authority, except where noted we will assume throughout that c is 
sufficiently small so that (3) holds, meaning that the principal always prefers 
centralization to delegation when centralization is feasible. 
 
B.  Disobedience 
  If the agent disobeys an order from the principal, the principal’s only recourse is 
to replace the agent with another who he hopes will be better. The principal’s utility when 
he gives an order that is disobeyed and subsequently replaces the agent (“centralization 
with disobedience”) is 
 
(4) ) )( 1 ( 2 P
CD s H H c V − − + + − = β α δ δα . 
 
  Of course, the principal prefers to have his order obeyed: 
CD C V V > . Whether he 
is better off giving an order that is disobeyed or simply delegating depends on the 
parameters. The benefit of giving an order even if it is disobeyed is that a bad agent will 
be revealed and replaced in the second period by a new draw from the distribution.
8 The 
disadvantage of giving an order is the cost of collecting information and the cost of 
finding a replacement. Giving an order is preferred (
D CD V V > ) if  
                                                 
8 Alternatively, the principal could become informed, not bother to give an order, but use his information to 
identify and dismiss a bad agent based on the action taken in the first period.   13
 
(5)  ) )( 1 ( P s H c − − < β α δ . 
 
Given our assumption that c is small enough so that (3) holds, the principal prefers 
centralization when feasible, and either delegates or gives an order that is disobeyed 
when centralization is infeasible. 
  In order for centralization to be feasible, two conditions must hold. First, the 
principal must be willing to fire a disobedient agent. Only a bad agent would consider 
disobeying an order. The principal is willing to dismiss a bad agent at the end of the first 
period if  0 ≥ + − H sP δβ δ . The principal’s incentive compatibility condition for feasible 




P P s H s ≡ < β . 
 
The principal’s cost of firing must be less than marginal value of employing a congruent 
agent rather than a bad agent in the second period, weighted by the probability of hiring a 
congruent agent. 
  The other feasibility condition is that the agent must prefer obeying and keeping 
his job to disobeying and being dismissed. The benefit of staying into the second period 
is that the agent can choose his preferred action without consequence from the principal. 
A bad agent disobeys if  b s b A δ δ ≥ − . Then the agent’s incentive compatibility condition 
for feasible centralization is 
 
(ICA) 
* / ) 1 ( A A s b s ≡ − > δ δ .   14
 
The agent’s cost of dismissal must exceed the difference between earning b in the first 
period and earning appropriately discounted b in the second period. 
  The two incentive compatibility conditions define the limits to centralization. 
Together with conditions (3) and (5), they characterize the principal’s choice of decision 
process, summarized in the following proposition and illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Proposition 1. In the absence of monetary contracts, centralization is optimal and 
feasible if and only if both ICP and ICA hold. If ICP holds but ICA does not hold, then 
centralization with disobedience is optimal if (5) is satisfied. In all other cases, 
delegation is optimal. 
 
Proposition 1 and Figure 1 indicate that even when the principal would prefer to 
make the decision himself (that is, (3) holds), he can only enforce his authority when the 
agent’s cost of dismissal is sufficiently high and his own cost of replacing the worker is 
sufficiently low. In all other cases, he will either delegate the decision to the agent, or 
give an order that is disobeyed by the bad agent. 
 
C.  Factors Affecting the Assignment of Authority 
  While previous research has studied how changes in information and agency 
problems alter the optimal assignment of decision authority, our model highlights how 
changes in the principal’s ability to control disobedience can drive the delegation 
decision. Here we discuss how the allocation of authority depends on the parameters. The 
implications that follow emerge in a transparent way from the basic model with no   15
monetary incentives, but as will be seen, most of them also hold when we consider 
monetary incentives. 
 
1.  Principal and Agent Separation Costs 
  A key idea of our paper is that the amount of centralization is limited by the 
principal’s and agent’s separation costs. The principal’s separation cost is comprised of 
the direct cost of dismissing a worker (creating a paper trail, counseling out, potential 
lawsuits, separation payments), locating and hiring a replacement, as well as the cost of 
training the new worker. Survey evidence indicates that managers and professionals are 
more costly to replace than manual workers, secretaries, and administrative and technical 
assistants.
9 Our model thus implies that managers and professionals will be given more 
decision rights, which may explain why white collar workers seem to have more 
autonomy in how they perform their jobs than blue collar workers. The information view 
of delegation also suggests giving white collar workers more control when they are more 
informed about the best course of action, but does not predict giving them control over 
aspects of their job where their information advantage is less obvious, such as scheduling 
of work hours and attire.
10 Similarly, because workers are easiest to fire in the private 
                                                 
9 See the series of surveys by the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development available at 
<www.cipd.co.uk/subjects/recruitmen/general/recruitretnt.htm>, for example, Tables 26 and 28 in 
Recruitment, Retention, and Turnover 2004: A Survey of the UK and Ireland. 
10 Of course, white and blue collar workers may differ along dimensions other than replacement costs. 
However, we are only aware of evidence regarding the differences in average productivities – with white 
collar workers being on average more productive – which do not play a role in our theory. There is no a   16
sector, more difficult to fire in government jobs (because of civil service laws), and 
extremely difficult to fire in higher education (because of tenure), our model implies 
significant centralization in firms, moderate centralization in government, and extensive 
delegation in universities. This squares with the assessment of George P. Shultz, former 
U. S. Secretary of State and the Treasury, who was also a top executive at Bechtel Group 
and dean of the University of Chicago’s graduate school of business: “In private 
enterprise you give an order and expect it to be carried out. In government, you give an 
order and hope that it will be carried out. And in higher education, you give no orders.”
11 
  The cost of replacing a worker is likely to be lower in a large firm than a small 
firm because large firms have more co-workers that can step in and cover for a dismissed 
worker until a replacement is found. Therefore, workers in small firms should have more 
autonomy than workers in large firms. We provide evidence on this implication later. 
  When the worker’s separation cost is low, the firm will delegate more because the 
principal has no stick to enforce his commands if the worker does not fear dismissal. This 
formalizes Arrow’s (1974, p. 64) observation: “The scope of this authority will usually be 
limited by the terms of the contract, and, more fundamentally, it is limited by the freedom 
with which an employee can leave the job.” The worker’s cost of being dismissed 
depends on worker characteristics as well as general market conditions. Well-developed 
labor markets are likely to reduce the cost of finding a new job by reducing the amount of 
search required. They are also likely to reduce the firms’ costs of replacing workers, 
                                                                                                                                                 
priori reason to believe that there are systematic differences between white and blue collar workers in their 
average congruence parameterβ , or in the importance of the decision, as measured by (H-0).  
11 The quote is attributed to Shultz by former U. S. Senator and Washington governor Daniel Evans 
(McReynolds, 2005, p.23).   17
which in principle makes any empirical predictions ambiguous. However, we would 
expect the effect of the workers’ separation costs to dominate, because in many firms a 
large part of the cost of hiring a new worker consists of training, which does not directly 
depend on the quality of the labor market.  
Our model thus identifies a link between the centralization of authority and 
general market conditions. This gives one way to understand the long run trend toward 
more autonomy in the workplace (Simon, 1945/1997, Ch. 7). As labor markets have 
expanded and workers have become more mobile, workers are less averse to losing their 
job, and firms must delegate more decision rights to them. Our analysis suggests that 
workers in economies with less developed labor markets will be given less flexibility in 
how they accomplish their tasks than workers in developed economies, and workers in a 
town dominated by a single employer will have fewer decision rights than workers in a 
city with competing employers. Similarly, to the extent that it is more difficult for firms 
to fire workers in Europe than the United States (due to labor laws) and a worker’s cost 
of being fired is lower in Europe than the United States (due to more generous 
unemployment insurance), our model predicts greater worker autonomy in Europe. 
  
2.  Discount Rate 
  The discount rate does not play a role in most existing models of delegation, but it 
is crucial in our analysis because the willingness of a worker to obey a command he 
dislikes today depends on how he values continuing on the job tomorrow. An increase in 
δ  makes it easier to satisfy the agent’s incentive compatibility condition (ICA) because 
the agent places a higher value on keeping his job.  In terms of Figure 1, an increase in δ    18
shifts down the border of the shaded centralization region. An increase in δ  also 
increases the principal’s value of centralization with disobedience relative to outright 
delegation because it increases the value of identifying and replacing a bad agent 
(condition (5)). This effect is represented by a rightward shift in the boundary between 
centralization with disobedience and delegation. The net effect of the two shifts is to 
expand the centralization region, reduce the delegation region, and increase the 
centralization with disobedience region relative to the delegation region (although not 
necessarily with respect to full centralization).  
  In short, the model suggests that delegation is more likely when the principal and 
agent heavily discount their future relationship. Since workers and managers of firms in 
distress are likely to discount the future at a higher rate, one implication is that distressed 
firms delegate more authority to workers. Similarly, firms in industries that are 
downsizing would delegate more, assuming their separation costs do not change. Finally, 
the job destruction rate in non-manufacturing industries is greater than in manufacturing 
industries (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999). We would therefore expect greater delegation 
in non-manufacturing industries.
12 
  The discount rate is also important in Baker et al. (1999), but it works in the 
opposite direction. In their model, the principal has unlimited ability to enforce orders 
and his problem is to find a way to credibly delegate. When the principal and agent 
discount the future, it is harder for the principal to commit not to intervene, and less 
                                                 
12 An alternative formulation of the model would let  δ − 1  be the probability that the firm goes out of 
business or is forced to lay off the worker in the second period. If worker and firm do not otherwise 
discount the future, it can be shown that payoffs and incentive conditions are identical to the current 
formulation.   19
delegation is the result. Alonso and Matouschek (2006) present a repeated game model 
which predicts that the principal will delegate if the discount rate is high, as in our model, 
but they focus on the trade off between information loss under centralization and agency 
problems under delegation rather than disobedience. 
 
3.  Congruence, Private Benefits, and Task Importance 
 The  parameters  α , b, and H  have already been discussed in the literature. A 
typical finding is that decisions are delegated when the principal and agent have 
congruent preferences (α  is high), when the worker has high private benefits associated 
with the decision (b is high), and when worker’s choice is relatively unimportant for the 
principal (H  is low). As noted, our model displays the same basic features when the 
principal’s commands are obeyed (see (3) and (5)), that is, when disobedience is not a 
concern. Private benefits and task importance also affect the allocation of authority by 
changing the constraints on obedience. An increase in private benefits makes the worker 
less obedient by tightening his incentive compatibility constraint, possibly making 
centralization infeasible.
13 An increase in task importance relaxes the principal’s firing 
constraint, making centralization more feasible. Thus, the effects on the constraints tend 
to reinforce the effects on the principal’s utility. 
  A more distinctive implication concernsβ , the probability that a new hire will 
share the preferences of the principal. This parameter could be high for firms that are 
                                                 
13 This is the effect of marginal private benefit. An increase in the absolute level of private benefits (which 
would require abandoning our normalization to zero of the agent’s private benefit from his disliked action) 
would work in the opposite direction, by making the agent more obedient for fear of losing the rents 
associated with his current job.   20
admired by some outsiders because of their innovative nature (Apple) or because of their 
association with social objectives that some workers share (Whole Foods). A high value 
of β  makes the firm more willing to dismiss a disobedient worker, shifting the 
principal’s incentive compatibility line right in Figure 1. Somewhat counter-intuitively, 
firms that can rely on outside workers to share their values may be less likely to delegate, 
even if the average congruence of existing workers (α ) is also higher. 
 
4.  Monetary Incentives 
  This section adds monetary incentives to the model, with several goals in mind. 
The first is to show that our results on separation costs are robust to inclusion of incentive 
contracts. More substantively, we are interested in how the availability of monetary 
incentives influences the allocation of authority: are monetary incentives complements or 
substitutes for delegation? This sheds light on differences in centralization between 
organizations that can use strong monetary incentives, such as firms, and organizations 
that cannot, such as government. It also provides insight into how new information 
technologies that allow finely tuned performance measurement, and hence greater use of 
monetary incentives (“management by objective”), may change the use of authority in the 
workplace. And finally, we want to explore how availability of monetary incentives 
affects the principal’s welfare. 
  Recall that the monetary contract pays the agent zero if output is zero and  t w  if 
output is H at time t. As a convention, we assume both  1 w  and  2 w  are paid in the second 
period when output is observed. To simplify, we assume throughout that  β α = , although 
we will continue distinguishing between the two in order to help the reader see where the   21
expressions come from. Also, we restrict our analysis to the case  H b H ≤ < − ) 1 ( β , 
omitting the less interesting cases where it is efficient to let the agent choose his preferred 
action ( H b > ) or where it can be shown that separation costs do not play a role 
( H b ) 1 ( β − ≤ ).
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A.  Optimal Monetary Incentives 
  Monetary incentives can be effective only if the principal gives an order because 
without an order the agent does not know which action the principal would like him to 
take. Therefore, in solving for the optimal contract, we only consider the case where the 
principal is informed.  In the second period, a bad agent obeys an order if and only if 
b w ≥ 2 . To minimize the wage bill, the principal sets  b w =
*
2  if monetary incentives are 
offered. The agent’s private benefit b thus determines the cost of using monetary 
incentives. If the principal knows the agent’s type, he never gives monetary incentives to 
a good agent because a good agent’s private benefits lead him to choose the right action. 
On the other hand, the principal always gives monetary incentives to a bad agent because 
0 ≥ −b H . If the agent’s type is unknown, the principal gives an incentive contract if 
H w H α ≥ −
*
2  or  b H ≥ − ) 1 ( α . Observe that the principal is more willing to give 
monetary incentives when the agent is known to be bad than when the type is uncertain.   
Given that  b H < − ) 1 ( β , a worker of unknown type (including a replacement) 
does not receive monetary incentives in the second period. Since a known bad agent 
                                                 
14 Even though it is efficient to follow the agent’s preferred choice when private benefits are sufficiently 
large, the principal might not find it optimal to do so because monetary transfers from the agent to the 
principal are not possible. None of our main implications below reverse if private benefits are large.   22
receives monetary incentives in the second period, replacing a disobedient worker is 
optimal if  b H H sP − ≥ + − β , or 
 
(7) 
* * ) 1 ( P P s H b s ≡ − − ≤ β . 
 
  Note that the cost of separation still matters here, but 
* *
P s  is less than 
*
P s H = β , the 
cutoff point for replacing a disobedient agent in the absence of monetary incentives. The 
availability of monetary incentives reduces the principal’s willingness to dismiss a bad 
agent because the principal can get compliance in the second period with a wage scheme 
instead of having to hire and train a new worker. 
  Turning to the first period, if 
* *
P P s s ≤ , the bad agent will be fired if disobedient, 
so he obeys an order if  A s b b w δ δ − ≥ + ) ( 1 . If 
* *
P P s s > , the principal will not fire a 
disobedient agent, but retain him and use monetary incentives in the second period. Then 
a bad agent obeys an order in the first period if  b b b w δ δ + ≥ + ) ( 1 . Using the definition 
δ δ / ) 1 (
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  As was the case without monetary incentives, the bad agent can be induced to 
obey an order with the threat of firing alone when 
*
A A s s ≥ . When 
*
A A s s < , to get 
obedience requires in addition a wage payment that brings the combined (wage +   23
separation) cost of disobedience up to 
*
A s . The optimal contract is as follows and depicted 
in Figure 2 (proved in the appendix). 
 
Optimal monetary incentives. Suppose the principal is informed and  H b H ≤ < − ) 1 ( β .  
(a) If 
* *
P P s s ≤ , then a disobedient agent is replaced, the principal uses monetary 
incentives in the first period if and only if  
 
(9) 
* * ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( A A P A s s H s s < < − − − − − β α α , 
 
 a bad agent obeys if monetary incentives are used or if 
*
A A s s ≥ , and (only) a known bad 
agent receives monetary incentives in the second period.  
(b) If 
* *
P P s s > , then a disobedient agent is not replaced, monetary incentives are not used 
in the first period, a bad agent disobeys in the first period, and (only) a known bad agent 
receives monetary incentives in the second period. 
 
Centralization with obedience is only feasible in regions I and II of Figure 2. In 
region III, the bad agent never obeys and is dismissed, so the principal faces a choice 
between delegation and centralization with disobedience. In region IV, the availability of 
monetary incentives may give rise to a new decision making arrangement in which the 
principal gives an order but instead of firing a disobedient agent, retains the agent and 
uses monetary incentives in the second period. For expositional convenience, we refer to 
this situation as “suggestion.” We shall use the term “authority” to mean centralization,   24
with or without obedience, and suggestion, that is, any situation in which the principal 
gives an order. 
We can now establish that the results developed earlier between authority and 
separation costs are robust to the introduction of monetary incentives.  
 
Proposition 2. When monetary incentives are available, an increase in  P s  or a decrease 
in  A s  can cause the optimal decision arrangement to shift from authority to delegation 
but not the other way around. 
 
B.  How Monetary Incentives Change Authority 
  This section studies how the allocation of authority varies depending on whether 
monetary incentives are or are not available. We can then ask, for example, how does 
centralization in government jobs where political considerations limit the use of monetary 
incentives, compare to centralization in firms? And will firms delegate more or less if 
new information technology allows better measurement of worker performance and 
closer links between pay and performance? The next proposition shows that monetary 
incentives can both complement and substitute for centralization. 
 
Proposition 3. If monetary incentives become available, then for 
* *
P P s s ≥ , the optimal 
decision arrangement can change from centralization to delegation or suggestion but not 
the other way around, while for 
* *
P P s s < , the optimal decision arrangement can change 
from delegation or centralization with disobedience to centralization but not the other 
way around.   25
 
In simple terms, Proposition 3 suggests that monetary incentives can lead to less 
centralization when P s  is large, and can lead to greater centralization when  P s  is small. 
Intuitively, availability of monetary incentives changes the tradeoffs in two ways. First, 
monetary incentives may make the threat of dismissal less credible because the principal 
can fall back on cash incentives in the second period instead of firing the worker and 
suffering the deadweight cost of dismissal. The cut-off level for  P s  in the principal’s 
(ICP) condition declines from 
*
P s  to 
* *
P s , which may force a switch from authority to 
delegation when  P s  is greater than 
* *
P s  by making centralization infeasible.  
In the other direction, monetary incentives can be combined with the threat of 
dismissal to augment the principal’s power to sanction. If the principal is willing to 
replace a bad agent (
* *
P P s s < ) but the agent’s separation cost is so low that the threat of 
dismissal alone cannot prevent disobedience, adding monetary incentives may boost the 
cost of dismissal enough to get compliance, and make centralization feasible when it 
would not be otherwise (region II in Figure 2). When  P s  is small, monetary incentives 
can lead to more authority by strengthening the principal’s ability to enforce commands.  
A typical finding in the literature is that more effective monetary incentives lead 
to more delegation since there is less need to control a worker when he is motivated by 
cash incentives (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991; Prendergast, 2002). A similar 
relationship arises in our model, but it appears because centralization becomes infeasible 
not because centralization becomes less desirable. Our analysis also shows that the effect 
can work in the other direction, which happens when monetary incentives strengthen the 
principal’s sanctions enough to make centralization feasible.     26
Proposition 3 also adds an interesting comparative static implication to the 
discussion: monetary incentives substitute for centralization when the principal’s 
separation cost is high, and complement centralization when the separation cost is low. 
As noted above, white collar jobs have higher separation costs for the principal than blue 
collar jobs. Our model thus suggests that the availability of monetary incentives is likely 
to increase delegation for white collar workers, and increase centralization for blue collar 
workers. A recent empirical study by Moers (2006), finds that better monetary incentives 
lead to more delegation in a sample of managers, consistent with our prediction. Our 
analysis would also imply that in environments where monetary incentives are scarce for 
exogenous reasons, such as government bureaucracies, white collar workers will have 
relatively more autonomy than their private sector peers, while blue collar workers will 
have less than their private sector peers.  
  Availability of monetary incentives gives the principal another tool and typically 
makes him better off. However, as the next proposition shows, introduction of monetary 
incentives can make the principal worse off in some circumstances (proof in appendix). 
 
Proposition 4. The principal can be worse off when monetary incentives are available 
than when they are unavailable. 
 
  Monetary incentives can be a problem for the principal by making it more 
difficult to credibly threaten a worker with dismissal. To see this, suppose that 
centralization is optimal when monetary incentives are unavailable. The principal can 
elicit good behavior from the bad agent in the first period at no cost with the threat of   27
dismissal. When monetary incentives are available, the threat of dismissal may not be 
credible, and the principal may be able to elicit good behavior only by paying for it. 
Thus, the principal may be forced to use a more costly tool to gain compliance. 
  Proposition 4 may provide some insight on the otherwise puzzling fact that many 
organizations seem to use few or no monetary incentives. If a firm can commit not to use 
monetary incentives, the threat of firing becomes more effective. Commitment might be 
achieved by not adopting monitoring technology even if it is available. The underlying 
logic also suggests that the principal would like to have monetary incentives available 
when the cost of replacing workers is high and decisionmaking is typically delegated.  
 
5.  Extensions 
  This section sketches several extensions to the basic model in order to illustrate 
how incorporation of disobedience into a model of authority may shed light on a variety 
of organizational issues. To keep results uncluttered, we focus on the model without 
monetary incentives.  
 
A.  Hiring Policies 
  The fact that compliance with orders is not guaranteed has ramifications for an 
organization’s hiring policy. When decisions must be delegated to a particular job holder, 
it changes the type of worker that the firm would like to have in that job. To analyze this, 
suppose 
*
A A s s ≥  and consider two jobs, one with low separation cost for the principal so 
centralization is optimal (that is, 
*
P P s s ≤ ) and the other with high separation costs so that 
delegation is optimal, respectively called the “blue collar” and “white collar” jobs for   28
short. Workers are characterized by α  and H; α  represents how closely the worker 
shares the organization’s objectives and H represents the importance of the worker’s 
choice, what might be called his marginal product or ability. We are interested in which 
characteristics are important for each job. For example, is congruence more valuable for 
the white collar or blue collar worker?  
Worker attributes are supplied elastically in the market at prices  α p  and  H p . A 
firm seeking to hire a worker for a job type  D C i , =  solves  
 
(10) } { max
, H p p V H
i
H − − α α α , 
 
where  H c V
C δ α) 1 ( + + − =  from (1) and  H V
D αδ 2 =  from (2).  
Observe that the marginal value of α  is higher for a decentralized than 
centralized job, all else equal:  α δ δ α d dV H H d dV
C D / 2 / = > = . Intuitively, congruence 
is more important for white collar workers than for blue collar workers because white 
collar workers are given more autonomy, making it more important that they share the 
organization’s goals. Conversely, the marginal product of worker ability is higher for the 
centralized than decentralized job, all else equal:  dH dV dH dV
D C / 2 ) 1 ( / = > + = αδ δ α . 
Ability is more important for blue collar workers than for white collar workers because 
the difference between centralizing and delegation for the principal consists of forcing the 
agent to choose H instead of zero.  
Solving the first order conditions, the solution to the hiring problem (10) is 
δ α 2 / H D p = ,  δ α 2 / p H D = , 1 ) / ( − = δ α H C p ,  δ α / p HC = , where subscripts indicate   29
the optimal values for centralized and decentralized jobs.
15 Firms will care more about 
recruiting workers that share their values for white collar jobs than blue collar jobs 
( C D α α > ). Along these lines, Simon (1991, p. 34) observes, “Pride in work and 
organizational loyalty are widespread phenomena in organizations . . . These traits are 
more strongly evident among skilled and managerial employees than among employees 
engaged in very routine work.” Conversely, managers will place a greater emphasis on 
the marginal product of decisions when hiring blue collar than white collar workers 
( D C H H > ) assuming that blue collar workers have less discretion in what they do.
16 
Marino (2006), in a hidden information model where the principal relies on 
communication from the agent about investment opportunities, also shows that managers 
may place a higher value on ability when decisions are centralized. The demand for talent 
is high in that context because low ability agents are particularly likely to distort 
information when the principal makes the decision. 
 
B.  Managerial Traits 
  Some evidence suggests that managers may be “hardwired” to take different 
approaches to their jobs (Simon, 1945/1997, commentaries on chapters 7, 10). Here we 
sketch an approach to the relation between authority and managerial traits. 
  One possible trait is empathy with workers. Dial and Murphy (1995) argue that 
some managers may find it personally costly to dismiss workers, because of empathy or 
                                                 
15 The optimal quantities do not depend on own prices because of linearity in the V functions. 
16 If the payoff in the low state is nonzero, it can be shown that the marginal product of the worker choice 
not the level, is larger for the centralized than delegation situation.   30
because firing a worker will subject the manager to criticism from others. We can model 
this as a disutility e from dismissing a worker, so that the incentive compatibility 
condition (ICP) for an “empathetic” manager becomes  e H sP − < β . 
  A straightforward implication is that an empathetic manager delegates more 
because empathy shifts the line dividing full delegation from centralization to the left in 
Figure 1. Less obviously, an empathetic manager also is less likely to have a worker 
disobey an order – not because workers reciprocate his concern, as it might appear, but 
because he avoids giving orders that would be disobeyed. 
  Similarly, some managers may derive utility from the exercise of power per se 
(Simon, 1945/1997, pp. 206-207). We can model this as a positive utility o from giving a 
command. This extension only changes the tradeoff between delegation and 
centralization with disobedience (condition (5)), with the latter now preferred if 
o H s c P + < + − β α δ ) 1 ( / . 
  Thus, a manager who enjoys exercising power is more willing to choose 
centralization with disobedience. Such a manager would give more orders than a 
“regular” manager, as one would expect. A more surprising implication is that all of the 
extra orders given by the power-hungry manager are disobeyed. Such a manager would 
therefore experience more disobedience and end up dismissing more workers. 
  
C.  Span of Control 
In information-based theories such as Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Garicano 
(2000), a manager’s span of control is limited because information cost rises with the 
number of subordinates. Yet one can imagine situations in which the principal’s   31
information cost is independent of the number of subordinates, for example, when a 
general decides whether his army should attack from one direction or another, or when a 
sales manager sets a marketing strategy. In such cases, information considerations do not 
appear to limit the span of control. This section shows how a desire to control 
disobedience may limit the span of control even when information considerations do not. 
The limit arises because the principal’s cost of replacing a worker is likely to be 
increasing in the number of workers dismissed (Arrow, 1974, p.71): “Clearly, if enough 
workers disobey orders, they cannot be enforced. . . . The firm simply cannot afford to 
fire them all.”  
To study this idea, we assume the principal’s marginal cost of dismissing the m-th 
worker is an increasing function  ) (m sP . The principal is willing to dismiss at most 
* m  
workers, the greatest m such that  H m sP δβ < ) ( . Worker separation costs are assumed to 
be large enough to induce obedience if disobedience results in certain dismissal (that is, 
ICA holds). Once an order is given, workers independently and simultaneously decide 
whether to obey or disobey, knowing their own type but without knowing the realized 
types of their coworkers. The manager observes worker choices sequentially and must 
make a final retention/dismissal decision on each case as it comes before him.
17 For 
example, a general gives orders to all soldiers at the same time but instances of 
disobedience come to his attention in an unpredictable order. If a disobedient worker is 
                                                 
17 Alternatively, we could also assume the manager randomizes which workers to punish from the set of disobedient 
agents. Either assumption prevents the manager from committing to a particular sequence of punishment, such as 
punish person A first, punish person B second, and so on. If such commitment is possible, the manager can 
guarantee universal compliance.    32
dismissed with probability q, then a bad worker chooses to obey if  δ δ / ) 1 ( − > b qsA . 
This incentive compatibility condition defines the critical probability that results in 
obedience:  
 
(11)  A s b q δ δ / ) 1 (
* − = . 
 
 If 
* q q <  then no bad agent will obey. 
We want to identify the largest number of workers, S, that can be given orders 
that will be obeyed.
 18  Specifically, we seek a span of control in which disobedience 
cannot arise in any possible Nash equilibrium. Disobedience is most difficult for the 
principal to control in the equilibrium where every bad agent chooses to disobey if any 
disobey, what might be called the “rebellion” equilibrium. In this case, which sets the 
limit on S, a bad worker’s probability of being dismissed for disobedience depends on the 
realized number of bad workers, x. If  1
* − ≤ m x , the worker will be dismissed with 
certainty, while if  1
* − > m x , he will be dismissed with probability ) 1 /(
* + x m . Given a 
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18 As we have already mentioned, it would be natural to let the marginal cost of dismissal also depend on the total 
number of workers, S, because there may be less disruption from a given number of dismissals in a large than a 
small team. We could incorporate this by making  P s  a decreasing function of S. Disobedience would still limit the 
span of control if the separation cost is sufficiently convex in m and S.   33
The maximum span of control that cannot be overwhelmed by rebellion is the solution to  
 
(13) 
* * ) , ; ( q m S q = α .  
 
  Equations (11)-(13) characterize the maximum span of control. One comparative 
static implication, consistent with the paper’s theme that centralization is limited by 
separation costs, is that the maximum span of control increases in the agent’s separation 
cost and decreases in the principal’s separation cost. Because white collar workers are 
more costly to replace than blue collar workers, as discussed above, our analysis implies 
that a manager will have fewer white collar workers than blue collar workers under his 
direction, and that hierarchies will be flatter at the bottom than at the top. It is also 
straightforward to establish that the maximum span of control is increasing in congruence 
and decreasing in the agent’s private benefits. 
  Equations (11)-(13) also suggest that centralization in a hierarchy is sensitive to 
tipping problems. As long as the probability of dismissing a disobedient worker is kept 
above ,
* q then all workers will follow orders. If the probability falls below  ,
* q  however, 
there can be a discrete jump in disobedience as all of the bad workers disobey. When a 
manager begins to lose control, it may quickly spread into a general “rebellion” as the 
ability to punish becomes ineffective. 
 
6.  Evidence 
  A central feature of our framework is that authority is limited by the cost of 
enforcing a command. As a result, the optimal assignment of decision authority depends 
not only on the information and private benefits of individuals in the organization, but   34
also on the firm’s cost of replacing workers and the cost for workers to find alternative 
employment. Very little statistical evidence exists on the factors that determine the 
allocation of authority. This section reports evidence based on a survey of organizations 
that suggests that the allocation of authority is in fact affected by separation costs, as 
would be the case if controlling disobedience is important. 
  The data are drawn from the National Organizations Survey, 1996-97 and 2002 
(Kalleberg et al., 2001; Smith et al., 2005). These surveys of managers and personnel 
officers contain a variety of information on employment policies, contracts, benefits, and 
the structure of organizations from across the United States. Our analysis uses data on 
corporations with at least 20 employees. Summary statistics of the variables we use are in 
Table 2. 
One question asked in the survey is 
 
How much choice do (workers) have concerning the best way to accomplish their 
assignments?  
1) No choice 
2) Small amount 
3) Moderate amount 
4) Large amount 
5) Complete choice 
 
The responses to this question are what we seek to explain. The dependent variable in all 
regressions takes on a value 1-5 corresponding to the answers. High values mean the firm 
has delegated authority to workers. 
Table 3 reports the regressions. The first three columns use data from the 1996-97 
survey and the last three columns use data from 2002. We do not combine the samples   35
because the questions asked differ somewhat between the two surveys. We first 
investigate how the firm’s cost of replacing a worker affects authority. In column (1), 
worker choice is regressed on a variable measuring how difficult it is for the firm to 
replace a worker. Our theory implies that workers will be given more discretion as the 
cost of replacing them rises. The coefficient on the proxy for replacement costs (0.11) is 
positive and different from zero at better than the 5 percent level. 
  The second column investigates how the worker’s cost of leaving the firm affects 
authority. Each firm was asked if it had provided worker training in the previous two 
years, and if so, if the training was valuable for other employers or only the firm itself. 
Based on the responses, each firm could be assigned to one of four categories: provided 
only general training, provided only firm-specific training, provided both general and 
firm-specific training, and provided no training. Dummy variables for the first three 
categories are the explanatory variables in column (2). To the extent that general training 
increases an employee’s outside options, our model suggests that the employee ends up 
with more decision authority. Consistent with this implication, the coefficient on general 
training (0.37) is positive and highly significant. The effect of firm-specific training is 
ambiguous in our model, possibly implying a modest effect on delegation. The 
coefficient  (0.18) is smaller than for general training and not statistically distinguishable 
from zero. The coefficient on the intermediate variable (0.24) is between the other two. 
  In column (3), the variables for firm and worker separation costs are included in 
the regression at the same time as well as two other control variables. The number of 
employees is included as a measure of firm size to capture the possibility that the amount 
of delegation is different in large and small firms. We might expect that co-workers can   36
more easily cover for a fired worker in a large than small firm, making a large firm’s 
separation cost lower than a small firm’s. Consistent with this view, the estimate on firm 
size (-0.04) indicates that large firms delegate less. The other control variable is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm sells a product instead of only a service. This is included to 
allow the amount of delegation to vary with the nature of the business. Firms that sell 
products give workers less choice than service firms, all else equal, and the difference is 
significantly different from zero. This could be seen as consistent with information 
theories if worker information is more important in service firms than manufacturing 
firms. When the controls are included, the coefficients on the critical variables increase in 
magnitude. A high cost of replacing a worker and firm-provided general training continue 
to be positively related to the amount of worker autonomy in carrying out assignments. 
Both coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level or better. 
  The other three regressions use data from 2002. The 2002 survey was 
significantly different than the 1996-97 survey, so the estimates serve as something of a 
robustness check. The dependent variable remains the 1-5 categorical response to the 
question of how much choice workers have in carrying out their assignments. In column 
(4), worker choice is regressed on the firm’s difficulty of hiring a replacement, as in 
column (1). The coefficient (0.21) is positive and statistically different from zero. Again 
we see that firms give their employees more authority when replacements are costly to 
hire. 
  In column (5), worker choice is regressed on a dummy variable for firm-provided 
training. The 2002 survey does not include information that can break down training into 
general and firm-specific. The summary statistics for Table 2 indicate that most training   37
in 1996-97 was general in nature. If the same pattern holds in 2002, then we can interpret 
the coefficient on the job training variable as largely due to the effect of general training. 
Consistent with this interpretation, the coefficient on job training is positive (0.22), 
however it is not significantly different from zero. 
  In column (6), the regression includes both explanatory variables as well as three 
additional control variables. One control variable, as before, is the number of employees. 
The coefficient (-0.17) again is negative but not different from zero at conventional levels 
of significance. The two other control variables are the fraction of employees earning less 
than $10 per hour ($20,000 per year), and the fraction earning between $10 and $15 per 
hour ($20,000 to $30,000 per year). The omitted category is the fraction of employees 
earning more than $15 per hour. These variables may capture differences in the skill level 
(or expertise) of workers. Consistent with existing theory, workers in the lowest wage 
category (interpreted as least expert) are given less freedom about how to complete their 
assignments. Workers in the middle wage category appear to have no more or less 
authority than high wage workers. As for the variables of primary interest: the coefficient 
on the difficulty of hiring a replacement (0.30) remains positive and is significant at 
better than the 1 percent level, while the coefficient on the training variable is positive 
(0.17) but too noisy to distinguish from zero.
19 
  To sum up, the evidence is generally consistent with the idea that the allocation of 
authority depends on the firm’s cost of replacing a worker and the worker’s cost of 
finding a new job. Unfortunately, the survey data do not include variables that can 
                                                 
19 The main finding from Table 3 are robust to a firm cutoff size of 30 workers, and to logistic regressions 
that measure autonomy as a discrete variable with 1 indicating “complete” or “a lot” of choice.   38
capture information advantages and agency problems, the critical factors in conventional 
theories of delegation, so the possibility remains that our separation cost variables are 
actually proxying for some other factor. Nevertheless, given the paucity of statistical 
evidence on the allocation of authority, we think the correlations are of intrinsic interest, 
and the fact that separation costs appear to matter is encouraging for a theory of authority 
that incorporates disobedience. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
In a general sense, our paper is intended to suggest that the emerging theory of 
authority hinging on agency and information problems is missing an important 
ingredient. Managers of an organization can give orders, but they rely on the willingness 
of subordinates to carry them out. In a world of imperfect contracting, a manager may not 
be able to enforce compliance with his instructions and this may compel him to delegate 
decision rights to workers – even if the manager has superior information or the agent’s 
private benefits will lead him astray. Our paper explores the consequences of this 
reasoning for the allocation of decision-making authority within organizations. In our 
theory, the key variables determining decision-making arrangements are the worker’s 
separation cost if he is dismissed and the firm’s cost of hiring a replacement. We 
formalize the intuition that high worker separation costs promote centralization, while 
high replacement costs for the firm lead to greater delegation, and provide evidence from 
a sample of firms consistent with these implications.  
Assigning an important role to the possibility of disobedience adds an intuitive 
dimension to the theory of authority, and also revives a theme that was central to classic   39
treatments of organization such as Barnard (1938/1968) and Simon (1945/1997). It also 
provides a natural explanation for anecdotes that are not easy to square with information 
theories, such as why professors are delegated more decision rights (for example, over 
work hours, attire, and content) than workers in firms, even though professors do not 
have an obviously larger information advantage over their “manager” (the dean or 
department chair) than workers in corporations. A model with disobedience also has 
implications for the role of monetary incentives, which we show can increase or decrease 
the manager’s authority, and can even make the manager worse off. We also show that 
the inability to enforce orders has implications for hiring policy, managerial style, and the 
span of control. For example, in jobs where significant decision authority must be 
delegated, the manager will make a greater effort to hire workers that share his values, 
while in jobs that are centralized, the manager will emphasize ability when hiring. 
There are a number of interesting avenues for future research. Our model does not 
distinguish the manager’s from the organization’s interests, so it is not well suited for 
studying when disobedience might be efficient for an organization. Incorporating agency 
problems between the shareholder and managers is a natural extension, one that Landier 
et al. (2005) explore. Our analysis, in keeping with the rest of the economics literature, 
emphasizes monetary and employment sanctions as the foundation for authority. 
However, as Simon (1945/1997, p. 184) observes, “There are a number of other . . . 
factors which may induce acceptance of authority in organization. . . . The social 
sanctions are the first to be noted, and perhaps the most important. Not only does society 
set up the individual expectations of obedience in certain social situations, but the 
individual who fails to accept his role will feel, in one way or another, the social   40
disapprobation of his fellows.” Another interesting extension would be to explore how 
social sanctions affect the benefits and costs of disobedience and centralization. Such an 
extension would capture an effect that seems important a priori, and would allow analysis 
of how and when organizations should nurture social sanctions and rewards in order to 
affect organizational performance (Lazear, 1991).   41
Appendix 
 
Proof of optimal monetary incentives 
(a) If 
* *
P P s s ≤  and 
*
A A s s < , then a disobedient worker is replaced and if monetary 
incentives are used in the first period,  A A s s w − =
* *
1  from (8). Since a bad agent obeys in 
the first period only if monetary incentives are provided, monetary incentives are optimal 
in the first period if  ) )( 1 ( ) (
*
P A A s H H H H s s H − − + + ≥ + + − β α α α α , which reduces to 
condition (9). If 
*
A A s s ≥ , then a bad agent will obey without monetary incentives given 
the credible threat of firing.  
(b) If 
* *
P P s s >  then a disobedient agent is not replaced and a bad agent disobeys without 
monetary incentives. Since the optimal first period wage is  δ /
*
1 b w =  from (8), monetary 
incentives are optimal in the first period if  ) )( 1 ( ) / ( b H H H H b H − − + + ≥ + − α α α α δ , 
which reduces to  1 ) 1 ( ≥ −α δ  and can never hold. || 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Let 
D A
R R V V D − ≡  denote the principal’s net payoff from authority rather than delegation 
in region R. Simple algebra gives  c H DI − − = ) 1 ( α δ ,  c s s H D A A II − + − − = ] ) 1 [(
* α δ , 
c s H D P III − − − = ) )( 1 ( β α δ , and  c b H DIV − − − = ) )( 1 ( α δ . Observe that II I D D = , 
III II D D = , and  IV III D D =   on the boundaries between the respective regions,  I IV D D < , 
and  II IV D D <  (the last inequality follows because  II D  increases in  A s , the smallest  A s  
within region II is on the boundary between regions II and III where III II D D = , and   42
IV III D D =  on the boundary between regions III and IV).  Hence, D (weakly) decreases in 
P s  and increases in  A s . This implies that an increase in  P s  or a decrease in  A s  cannot 
cause a switch from delegation to authority.  
To see that an increase in  P s  or a decrease in  A s  can cause the decision 
arrangement to shift from authority to delegation, suppose  P s  and  A s  are such that we are 
in region II,  A s  is close to 
*
A s ,  and  H c ) 1 ( α δ − < , so that centralization is feasible and 
optimal. Then if  ) )( 1 ( b H c − − > α δ , an increase in  P s  that induces a shift from region II 
to region IV will cause a change from centralization to delegation. Similarly, starting at 
the same point in region II, a decrease in  A s  will cause a change from centralization to 
delegation if  H c b H ) 1 ( ) )( 1 ( α δ α δ − < < − −  and if  P s  is close to 
* *
P s , because 
IV III D D =  on the boundary between regions III and IV.  || 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
  As in the proof of Proposition 2, let  R D  be defined as the principal’s net payoff 
from authority rather than delegation in region R of Figure 2. Suppose 
* *
P P s s >  (region 
IV). When monetary incentives are not available, centralization can be optimal and 
feasible when (ICA) holds and 
* * *
P P P s s s > > . When monetary incentives are available, 
centralization is not feasible because the principal cannot credibly threaten to replace a 
disobedient agent – he would rather retain the agent and place him on an incentive plan 
than pay the separation cost. Therefore, introduction of monetary incentives can never 
make centralization optimal. The optimal arrangement with monetary incentives is 
delegation if  0 < IV D  and suggestion otherwise.    43
 Now  suppose 
* *
P P s s ≤ . In region I, regardless of the availability of monetary 
incentives, centralization is optimal if (3) holds and delegation is optimal otherwise 
(because (3) implies  0 > I D ). Similarly, in region III, regardless of the availability of 
monetary incentives, centralization with disobedience is optimal if (5) holds and 
delegation is optimal otherwise (because (5) implies  0 > III D ). In these two regions, 
introduction of monetary incentives does not change the optimal decision arrangement.  
Finally, consider region II. Without monetary incentives, centralization is not 
feasible because 
*
A A s s ≤ , so introduction of monetary incentives cannot induce a change 
away from centralization. When monetary incentives are available, centralization is 
feasible and optimal when  0 > II D . Therefore, introduction of monetary incentives can 
lead to a shift from delegation to centralization (if (5) does not hold) or from 
centralization with disobedience to centralization (if (5) holds). || 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Suppose separation costs and the cost of becoming informed are such that centralization 
is feasible and optimal without monetary incentives, that is 
*
P P s s < , 
*
A A s s > , and (3) 
holds. The principal’s payoff when monetary incentives are unavailable is given by 
C V  
in (1). Suppose in addition that 
* *
P P s s > . Then with monetary incentives, the principal is 
unwilling to dismiss a disobedient agent. The principal’s payoff if he delegates is lower 
than 
C V  by construction. Alternatively, the principal can give an order and use monetary 
incentives in the second period, which yields  b H H c V
CM ) 1 ( α δ δ δα − − + + − = . The 
difference is  0 ) 1 ( < − − = − b V V
CM C α δ .  ||   44
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  Figure 2. Obedience and Dismissal with Monetary Incentives 
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Note. The figure shows the behavior of the bad agent and the principal’s reaction to disobedience for 
various parameter configurations, assuming the principal is informed and gives a command. 
“Disobedience” means the bad disobeys an order. “Dismissal” means a disobedient agent is dismissed. 
Monetary incentives are used in the first period only in the shaded region. In the second period, monetary 
incentives are given only to an agent who was disobedient in the first period. The figure shows the 
configuration when  H b H < < − ) 1 ( β . On the vertical axis,   from (ICP) and 
.  
δ δ / ) 1 (
* − ≡ b s A







  Table 1. Payoffs    ) , , ( B G A A P
 
  Agent’s action
 
1 a   2 a  
 
State    1 = i
 
 
) 0 , , ( b H  
 
) , 0 , 0 ( b  
 
State    2 = i
 
 
) , 0 , 0 ( b  
 
) 0 , , ( b H  
 
Note. This table shows the payoffs of the principal (P), good agent ( ), and bad agent ( ), conditional 
on the state and the agent’s action choice (a). 
G A B ATable 2. Summary Statistics and Variable Descriptions 
 
 Mean  S.D.  Min  Max  N  Description 
 
1996-97 
Worker choice (1 = no choice, 5 = 
complete choice) 
3.17  0.90  1  5  321  How much choice do employees have concerning the best way 
to accomplish their assignments? 
Difficulty of hiring (1 = very easy, 4 = 
not at all easy) 
2.58  0.92  1  4  313  How easy is it to hire employees with necessary skills? 
General training (1 = yes, 0 = no)  0.33  0.47  0  1  316  Was there formal job training in last 2 years and were skills to 
a great extent useful to other employers? 
General and firm-specific training (1 = 
yes, 0 = no) 
0.24  0.43  0  1  316  Was there formal job training in last 2 years and were skills to 
some extent useful to other employers? 
Firm-specific training (1 = yes, 0 = no)  0.06  0.24  0  1  316  Was there formal job training in last 2 years and were skills 
not at all useful to other employers? 
Employees 
 
1.03  2.44  0.02  30.00  331  Full time employees (in thousands) 
Main business involves a product (1 = 
yes, 0 = no) 
0.56  0.50  0  1  331  Main business can involve product, service, or both. This 
variable is 1 if product, or product and service. 
2002 
Worker choice (1 = no choice, 5 = 
complete choice) 
3.12  0.83  1  5  97  How much choice do employees have concerning the best way 
to accomplish their assignments? 
Difficulty in hiring (very easy = 1, not 
at all easy = 4) 
2.36  0.92  1  4  99  How easy is it to hire employees with necessary skills? 
Job training (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
 
0.76  0.43  0  1  100  Was there formal job training in last 2 years? 
Employees 
 
0.41  0.78  0.02  4.5  100  Full time employees (in thousands) 
Low wage employees 
 
0.26  0.28  0  1  94  % employees earning less than $10/hour 
Middle wage employees  0.30  0.23  0  1  89  % employees earning $10-$15/hour 
 
Note. The sample includes only corporations (i.e. it excludes sole proprietorships and partnerships). Also, only firms with more than 20 workers in the core area 
are included. Worker choice, difficulty in hiring, and training variables apply only to core employees. Table 3. Regressions Explaining the Amount of Choice Workers Have in Completing Their Assignments 
 
 1996-97      2002 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
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Employees (thousands)  …  …  -0.04
*
(0.02) 
… …  -0.17 
(0.11) 
Dummy=1 if main business involves product  …  …  -0.27
***
(0.10) 
… … … 
% employees earning < $10/hour  …  …  …  …  …  -0.57
*
(0.32) 
























2 0.013 0.031 0.074  .051  .013  0.159 
N 310  313  309  97  97  86 
 
Note. Each column is a regression. The main entries are the coefficients, and standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the numerical 
response to the question: How much choice do employees have concerning the best way to accomplish their assignments? (1 = no choice, . . ., 5 = complete 
choice). Variable definitions and summary statistics are in Table 2. Significance levels: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 